Saturday, May 26, 2012

AQEU

Al Qaeda European Union
apprehending suspicious individuals with no clear connections to terrorist networks is legally problematic.
Let's digest this meaning:
we can locate 2 major issues the first one is the term clear. If anyone is still thinking that CT is about clear networks, networking and groups or even ideas and ideology so it's about time or more correct the last second to wake up!
the other concept is terrorist networks. Any newbe Jihadist is emerging forged with the insight that team work is bad in this business as CT is still stuck in trying to identify, categorize, describe and searching after indicators and hits that may indicate an upcoming terror attack. one man terror organization is the asked solution! "Combating individuals acting in apparent isolation,some experts and CT folk are saying, will take smarter measures in monitoring the Internet, better intelligence and international cooperation in counterterrorism efforts.
apprehending suspicious individuals with no clear connections to terrorist networks is problematic." apparent isolation? I think that the individual terrorist and the CT community are understanding isolation in a very different manner.... monitoring the Internet ...... keep on monitoring it with old school approach and see what happened. The modern terrorist is all about avoiding clear connections to terror networks or terror key persons ....

Saturday, January 14, 2012

Definitons

Lets face it -  we are at war and the real fights are still ahead.
Don't let the definitions jungle for terror and criminal acts to confuse you. Under an active shooter attacks for example, the victims don't really care the way you will define it, they need your help and they need it ASAP!
If you are going to let those limitations,( definitions ), to define your roles and goals as a first responder you are going to miss your targets and innocent people will miss their lives.!
As first responders our main and most important goal is to save lives and not to look after some definitions for the situation we are facing.
I hope that those who are composing the definitions will find some time to think about it!
 

Thursday, September 22, 2011

The chase for evidence

The Counter terror comunity is obssessed with the gathering of evidence that will help to convict terror suspects in court.
This obssession has some serious side effects on how we are fighting terror threats.
must admit that terrorists do not care much about laws and regulations, but they are very good at abusing the legistlation system and democracy to their purposes.
.Collecting evidence process has became a complicated, diffuse, and bureaucratic thing. It seems that we missed the point of this process along the way.
As we see it, when it comes to counter terrorism the process of collecting evidence is crucial for the follow purposes:
To use as a tool to find terrorists and prevent their attacks.
The evidence material to be collected should help us in understanding an knowing our enemy especially while dealing with more loosely affiliated, transnational terrorist networks who are difficult to predict, track, and penetrate.We have to remember that their funding and logistical networks cross borders, are less dependent on state sponsors, and are harder to disrupt.They make use of widely available technologies to communicate quickly and securely.
The fact that Intelligence and law enforcement communities lack the ability to prioritize, translate, and understand in a timely fashion all of the information to which they have access empphasize the role of evidence material as Intelligence instrument.
Intelligence derived from evidence materials can provide indispensable warning and supports all aspects of  counterterrorism operations, including military and law enforcement operations. Such intelligence is a necessary complement to that derived from human sources.
Terror acts should not be included in the range of criminal offences. As long as they are, the evidence material and the process of gathering it for the purpose of a conviction in court will only continue to complicate the war on terror.
The increase in the liability of individuals, under counter terror laws, to be subject to detention or imprisonment without evidence of criminal guilt being led and proved against them in court is undesirable, but they are necessary evils in the war on terror.
Remember: if you don't stand for something you will fall for anything!

Wednesday, September 7, 2011

The riskful Arab spring

It is interesting to see this term - the Arab spring-  over and over again. The use of the word spring can indicate that this "spring" has a lot in common with weather prognoses as no one can realy say how long it will take before this spring will become into a radical Islamic storm.

Egypt - the revolt in Egypt that gained a huge support from the western world has created a dangerous and unstable situation both in north Africa and the south of Israel. The Muslim brotherhood and Salafi extremists gained power and freedom to operate and the current military regime is experiencing difficulties to control them.
This situation placed the Sinai peninsula as a green house for Islamic terror groups that are using this space as an arsenal storage as well as a jumping off ground for executing terror attacks.


Lybia - since NATO launched its operation to unseat Qaddafi,and the huge aid it provides to the new regime, it become clear that this regime is pro Al Qaeda, Salafi extremists and global Jihad. One of the reasons for this aid is the thinking that in the long term these extremists will embrace moderation and democracy.
These trends are indicating a deep misunderstanding. The thinking that in the long term the Radical Islam elements will become moderate is effecting the way that western countries, the E.U. countries for example, are reacting to the radical Islamic groups and populations that positioned within these countries. Avoiding confrontation with these groups and ideas now will make things harder in the long term.
A passive reaction to terror threats and acts by democratic countries is an open call for terrorists and extremists.

Monday, August 29, 2011

August combined terror attack in south Israel - processing the intelligence

What we know from OSINT ( Open Source Intelligence ):
  1. There were Intel. reports prior to the attack that indicated where and when it will take place.
  2. Some early reports related to specific locations were used by the terrorists to prepare the attacks.
  3. The complexity of the terrorism climate in the Sinai desert was continiously evaluated and monitored.
  4. The terrorism infrastructure in the Sinai desert is challenging for the intelligence organizations.
  5. The terrorists prepared the attacks for a long time, some of the preparations took place inside Israel around the locations in which the attacks took place.
Lets see what we got here.
  • The Intel. was accurate enough and the Israeli security forces were deployed to the area before the attacks. The reports pointed high propability for attacks along about 100 km route by the border between Egypt and Israel.
  • Some scenarios and reactions situations took place prior to the attacks.
  • The political relations with Egypt played a major role while different operative reactions regarding intercepting the attacks were discussed.
  • One of the options was amilitary special operation in Sinai desert targeting the terrorists.
  • Based on prior terror attacks and M.Os related to the P.R.C.and other extreme Islamic terror groups  the possibility of kidnapping soldiers or civilians was consider as the main goals of these attacks.
  • The weather conditions, ( foggy weather ), on the day of the attacks were the same to those who were under the kidnapp of the soldier Gilad Shalit.
The peace treaty between Israel and egypt has a major role in the way the decisions makers in Israel were reacting and preparing to this threat.
The will to strength the current regeime in Egypt before and after the attacks may be an important lesson in counter terrorism.
By not responding correctly to terror threats as a result of different conciderations,  the decisions maker are creating dangerous precedents. It is done on a global level and in many countries.One of the reasons to this trend is that the decision makers lack the relevant knowledge and the understanding regarding the socio-cultural and the personal behavior background of terror groups or individuals.The same happens with half done counter terror operations - such as operation Cast Lead in Gaza. The main goals were to stop the fire from Gaza strip into Israel and the other was to destroy smugling tunnels and by that stop the transfer of weapons and persons into Gaza strip. The operation itself conducted within a very narrow window of international politics oppertunities. The short term objectives regarding the two main goals above were achived but as for the long term objectives the operation failed to achive them and the situation became even worse. Hamas became stronger, Iran and Hizbulla got their share as major players, radical Islamic terror groups have established themselves in the area and their and al Qaida influence is being enhanced.We can say that Gaza strip amd the Sinai peninsula are transforming into an innovative and challenging theater for counter terrorism.The fact that the Sinai peninsula is a part of Egypt has a lot to do with the socio political situation within Egypt and the influence that the Muslim Brotherhood has on the main players in this new theater.
We see the presence of power players as Iran, Hizbulla, the global Jihad, Salafi Jihad and other active players in this theater very potent in terms of terror activity but we also think that both Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood are not fully aware of the threats that these players are representing for them as new regimes in this area.

Monday, August 22, 2011

Background of Salafi Jihad in GAZA -Sinai

Though the first prominent assault by Salafi-Jihadis inGaza occurred before the Israeli withdrawal in August and September 2005, it was not until the period of anarchy caused by fighting between Fatah and Hamas in 2006 and 2007 that such groups proliferated and their attacks became widespread. These, however, were directed mainly  at symbols of Western or un-Islamic influence within Gaza, such as internet cafes, music shops, video stores, hair salons and pharmacies.Since Hamas took over and restored security in Gaza, Salafi-Jihadis have had much less freedom of manoeuvre. The faceless groups that sprung up and  claimed responsibility for attacks during the period of post-election turmoil– Jund Allah (God’s Soldiers), Suyuf al-Haq (Swords of Righteousness), Jaysh al-Quds al-Islami – Tandhim al-Qa’ida fi Ard al-Ribat (Jerusalem Islamic Army – al-Qaeda Organisation in Palestine), Fatah al-Islam fi Ard al-Ribat (The Triumph of Islam in Palestine), Jund Muhammad (Soldiers of Muhammad) and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem) – have mostly disappeared. Somemembers have been killed and imprisoned; others are underground or have new Salafi-Jihadi affiliations; still others, having renounced old beliefs, joined or rejoined established factions. Of the groups that have persisted or since arisen, two have stood out in size and significance: Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam) and Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers of God’s Supporters). The former participated in the 2006 abduction of Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit and the kidnapping over the following year of several foreign journalists; the latter attacked Israeli troops while riding explosive-laden horses in June 2009 and confronted Hamas at the Ibn Taymiyya Mosque in Rafah two months later. Both groups have unsuccessfully challenged Hamas, and both have been led by militants once allied with it. Jaysh al-Islam came to prominence during the chaotic interval following Hamas’s 2006 electoral victory. Hamas found the group useful at first. But as it revealed its sympathies with al-Qaeda, it became a liability, and Hamas, after taking over Gaza, swiftly took action against it. Jaysh al-Islam was formed by members of the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), one of Gaza’s larger militant factions, around the end of 2005. It is led by Mumtaz Dughmush, a former member of the PA’s Preventive Security Organisation who for years allegedly had been contracted for militant operations by both Hamas and Fatah. He comes from one of Gaza’s larger and more powerful clans, which controlled the Sabra neighbourhood of Gaza City until Hamas took it by force in September 2008. A Hamas official claimed Dughmush was deranged, illiterate and obsessed with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the deceased leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq. Dughmush was reputed to be unafraid of confronting the PA in the years before Hamas took over Gaza. According to a leader of the PRC, of which he was once a member, he had close ties to senior Qassam Brigades leaders, for whom he sometimes did “dirty work” for which they preferred not to be blamed. These operations embroiled him in “personal fights” he did not want the PRC dragged into, which is one reason he left the organisation. In April 2006, Hamas appointed the PRC’s founder, Jamal Abu Samhadana, as chief of oversight of the interior ministry and head of the Executive Force, a policing unit established in Gaza during the tug-of-war over security forces that followed the January 2006 legislative  elections. Around this time, according to PRC members, Samhadana and members of the Qassam Brigades began digging a tunnel for a large kidnapping operation inside Israel, but he was assassinated in an Israeli airstrike, on 8 June 2006, before the operation could take place.71 Samhadana’s tunnel was used just under three weeks later, when members of Hamas, the PRC and Dughmush’s splinter group, Jaysh al-Islam, kidnapped Shalit. Two Israeli soldiers died in the operation, as did two Palestinian militants, one of them a member of Jaysh al-Islam, which announced its existence the following day. At the time of the abduction, Jaysh al-Islam had not revealed any signs that it intended to conduct the sort of attacks against Westerners that would cast Hamas’s past collaboration with the group in an unfavourable light. But seven weeks after Shalit’s capture, it seized two journalists working with Fox News (U.S.), called for the “liberation of Muslims detained in American prisons” and forced the hostages to convert to Islam before letting them go. Hamas said it had received assurances that similar acts would not recur. The following year, after its March 2007 capture of Alan Johnston, a British reporter for the BBC, Jaysh al-Islam demanded the release from UK custody of an al-Qaeda-affiliated Palestinian-Jordanian cleric, Abu Qatada al-Filastini (Omar Mahmoud Othman), whose recorded sermons were found in a Hamburg apartment rented by oneof the 11 September 2001 hijackers, Muhammad Atta.Crisis Group Middle East Report N°104, 29 March 2011
We'll be back soon with an opeartional review and conclusions regarding the terror attack that took place on august 22 in south Israel.

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

Gun policy and the July 23 massacre in Norway

Nordics set sights on gun control after Norway attacks
STOCKHOLM — In the Nordic countries, where hunting is popular and firearms are plentiful, the twin July 22 attacks that killed 77 people in Norway have spurred lawmakers to consider tighter gun laws.
But change will not come without resistance in a region where hunting is viewed by many as a cultural heritage passed down from Viking ancestors, and sport shooting is a favourite pastime.
Finland, which has one of the world's highest gun ownership rates at 1.5 million firearms for 5.3 million people, has reopened the debate on arms control just two months after new, stricter laws raised the firearm licence age from 15 to 20 for short weapons and 18 for hunting guns.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j2UmRo2D-cxGW-2hToaMRupUL_Zw?docId=CNG.f86f7de5aa4632fa5f9294df8b17a703.561
I wonder how no one of the Norwegian folk who are living around the island where the massacre took place didn't think to take his or her gun and go out and check what is going on. I'm talking about folk with licensed guns of course.
The easy thing to do is to tight gun control, it is cheap and convenient. We all know that criminals and terrorists are applying for gun permits before executing their crimes and we are all sure that a harder gun control will stop them of using guns....
Wake up, the bad guys will get any type of gun if they need it. You will be surprised to know how easy it is to smuggle guns into the Nordic countries, not to mention explosives, you don't even need to carry it on you.
so instead of making law abiding citizen's lives harder, lets start with some firearms education so folk who have guns will know how to use them when their community is under attack.